The known unknowns of the 2024 election (part 2)
Breaking down the big questions that will determine whether Biden wins a second term
This is the second part of a piece I published earlier this week. You can read part one here.
1. The future of the border situation
In addition to the economy and Israel-Hamas war, the influx of migrants at the country’s southern border has been a problem for Biden for most of his first term, as border crossings hit a record high this past December. Much of this is due to the fact that unlike in the past, when migrants coming north to the U.S. would usually try to sneak in and evade detection by the Border Patrol, many now give themselves up at the border and apply for asylum. As the nation has emerged on the other side of the COVID-19 pandemic, asylum claims have skyrocketed.
Republicans have done their best to keep this issue in the spotlight and cause political headaches for Biden and the Democrats. In 2022, GOP governors in southern states began sending busloads of migrants to heavily Democratic areas like Chicago, New York City, Washington DC, and even Martha’s Vineyard—all of which are “sanctuary cities” or in sanctuary states. Texas Governor Greg Abbott has also instigated a high-profile fight with the U.S. Department of Justice after being ordered to remove razor-wire buoys he installed to prevent migrant crossings, a fight that has been working its way through the courts in recent months. Just this week, House Republicans tried (but failed) to impeach Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, under whose purview border protection falls.
Far from blaming the GOP for these clear political stunts, Americans up to this point broadly trust them more than Democrats to get a handle on the nation’s immigration system. The share of Americans calling illegal immigration a “very big problem” reached 47 percent last year—up from 38 percent in 2022 and at its highest point since 2016. And they have broadly pointed the finger at Biden for this: his approval rating on immigration hit an all-time low last month.
Biden seems well aware of the optics of all this, and it’s worth noting that his administration has not been sitting on its hands. They have made a record number of arrests at the border. They have also increased deportations of individuals who crossed over illegally.
Biden may also have a chance to flip the politics of this issue. Over the past several weeks, a bipartisan immigration deal had been working its way through Congress. Initially, Republicans demanded the deal in exchange for funding for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. The final legislation was molded to their liking—the conservative Wall Street Journal editorial board called it “the most restrictive migrant legislation in decades”—and Biden said he would sign it. Then, the GOP (led by Donald Trump) realized that passing this bill might give Biden a political win in an election year and take the issue off the table for the campaign, so they tanked it entirely. Ironically, by refusing to pass the bill, they may have given Biden a chance to go on the offensive anyway—something he is all too eager to take advantage of.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
How effective is Biden’s effort to blame Trump and the Republicans for the failed deal?
Do migrant encounters at the border continue to increase throughout the year?
Does Biden taken any unilateral steps to crack down on illegal border crossings?
Do Biden’s approval polls on this issue change at all? For better or for worse?
What share of voters in November highlight immigration as the top issue facing the country? How do they vote? How do each of these differ from 2020?
2. The outcome of Trump’s trials
The future of Donald Trump’s numerous criminal trials could have a big impact on the outcome of the election, should they be resolved before then. His trials, dealing with everything from financial impropriety to handling of classified materials to efforts to overturn the 2020 election, are all currently at various stages. It remains uncertain, however, whether any of them will deliver a ruling—and a possible conviction—before Americans start casting their votes in mid-September.1
Any single conviction, let alone multiple of them, could carry a significant electoral cost for Trump. Multiple polls have now shown that if he were convicted of a felony crime, it could produce a seismic political shift and make it nearly impossible for him to win the election. This is no doubt in part why Trump’s team has tried to initiate delays in each trial. If successful, it could yield dual benefits. First, it would remove the liability of a possible criminal conviction for the rest of the campaign. Additionally, if he then wins the election, he’d be in position as president to order the Department of Justice to drop the federal charges against him and try to claim presidential immunity in the remaining cases.
There’s also a separate matter of his eligibility to be on the November ballot at all. Colorado and Maine have taken steps to disqualify him from their respective primary ballots—a sign they would likely do the same in the general election—arguing that he violated the 14th amendment to the constitution, which bars those who have “engaged in insurrection or rebellion” against the country from holding federal office.2 That case has already made its way before the Supreme Court, which will hear arguments about it today.
Suffice it to say: the outcome of these cases could have a monumental impact on the race, especially if Trump is convicted or kicked off the ballot in key swing states.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
How does the Supreme Court rule on Trump’s eligibility?
Do any of Trump’s criminal trials come to a conclusion before November? Is he convicted in any of them?
Do the people telling pollsters a criminal conviction would be a dealbreaker mean it, or might some of them vote for him anyway?
3. Trump’s appeal beyond his base
One of the biggest stories to come out of both the 2016 and 2020 elections was about why the polls were so off. In both cycles, they predicted big wins for the Democratic presidential nominees over Trump, including in swing states, only for the final results to show that Trump punched far above his (polling) weight. A primary reason for this was because of a group whom some analysts call “Trump-only” voters. These voters, who are disproportionately white, working class, and from rural areas, rarely vote (and may not have even been registered prior to 2016) but will turn out to support Trump when he is on the ballot.
However, much has changed since Trump was last up for election. For starters, the events on January 6 are now a factor in a way they were not in either of the last two elections. As Politico observed recently:
Democrats and independents still hold starkly negative views of Jan. 6, its participants and Trump’s role in stoking the riot. Majorities of Americans overall still believe now-President Joe Biden was elected legitimately, that Trump is guilty of trying to steal the election and that the federal criminal charges in Washington against Trump are appropriate.
He is also now facing an array of criminal charges, his rhetoric has grown increasingly illiberal and anti-democratic, and he has invoked terminology used by dictators throughout history to describe immigrants to the United States. At minimum, none of this behavior is geared toward broadening his appeal to parts of the electorate he didn’t win last time, and it’s possible some of this will scare away independents who might otherwise side with him on issues like the economy and border security.
Still, given both Trump and Biden’s deep unpopularity, this election may ultimately hinge less to which of them can broaden their appeal from last time and more on which one can simply keep more of their 2020 coalition intact.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
Do the Trump-only voters of the past two elections come back out a third time?
Does Trump make inroads with any new voters who weren’t already on his side in 2016 or 2020 (especially among non-white populations)?
4. The effectiveness of Democrats’ messaging on abortion and democracy
Most Democratic strategists these days seem to agree that this year’s election will be decided by only about 100,000 votes (at most) across a handful of states. What they’re less in agreement on, however, is the most effective strategy for defeating Trump. There is a growing fault line on this front that has basically produced two camps:
One believes that to help Biden get over the hump, it is more important for him to fixate his outreach on working-class swing voters living in swing states and talk to them about the issues that impact their daily lives—namely, the economy, which voters routinely highlight as the most important issue facing the country.3
The other believes that because we’re in such a highly polarized environment, voters will be primarily driven by negative polarization—or which candidate is more successful in convincing them that the other guy is an eminently worse choice. Thus, it’s more prudent for Democrats to focus obsessively on issues like abortion, on which they have a political advantage, as well democracy and “Republican extremism” to both motivate their base and potentially scare swing voters away from Trump.4
So far, Biden seems to be employing a mix of both strategies. In several swing states, he has been messaging on his administration’s accomplishments and efforts to improve the economy and fix problems in the country’s healthcare system. However, at a national level, he is still largely focusing on democracy and abortion. In fact, the Democratic Party has worked to get measures protecting abortion access on the 2024 ballot in several key states to boost turnout. As I’ve previously written, though, the evidence showing that abortion is a difference-making issue for Democrats is murky, and while these measures have an extensive track record of success, there isn’t a clear causal link between that success and Democratic candidates winning.
Of course, the issue landscape is rarely stable for long, and any number of events between now and November could shake up that picture. But as things stand, it appears Biden is largely going to frame this election around the existential threat of a second Trump term—even as voters continue highlighting immigration and cost of living as their most pressing concerns.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
Does Biden’s/the Democrats’ messaging on abortion and democracy begin to resonate with the electorate enough to boost him in the pre-election polls? On Election Day?
Does Biden continue to primarily press the issues of abortion and democracy? Or does his messaging on the economy and immigration meaningfully pick up?
5. Biden’s standing among rural and white working-class voters
An underrated reason why Biden won in 2020 was because he outperformed Clinton among segments of the electorate that traditionally vote Republican. This specifically includes white voters who do not hold a college degree and rural voters, both of which make up substantial shares of the electorate. At the national level, Clinton won just 34 percent and 30 percent from these groups, respectively. Four years later, Biden did only slightly better, winning 37 percent and 33 percent, respectively. However, in an election that was decided by only about 43,000 votes across three states, Biden’s marginal improvement with these groups was likely hugely impactful.
Heading into 2024, the question of whether Biden can replicate that showing looms large. As I outlined in Part 1, he has experienced an erosion of support among core Democratic constituencies, including young people and voters of color. He and Democrats have, though, been offsetting these losses elsewhere. In contrast with much of the last several decades of American politics, the groups with which Democrats have been gaining ground are now much whiter, better-educated, and likely to live in suburban areas (all three of which were factors that for decades signified a higher likelihood of voting Republican).
Biden’s nightmare scenario is that support from young and non-white voters does not bounce back and support from rural and non-college white voters regresses back to Clinton’s levels. At that point, any ground he has gained among white, college-educated suburbanites is unlikely to be enough to offset those losses. Much hinges on his ability to stabilize the ship with at least one of those first two sets of voters.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
Does Biden try to reach out to these traditionally Republican voting blocs like non-college whites and rural voters at all during the campaign?
Does Biden at minimum maintain his margins with these voters from 2020? If not, is he able to offset any losses anywhere?
6. The performance of the “meh” voters
A term first coined by the Cook Political Report’s Amy Walter, “meh” voters are those who “somewhat disapprove” of the president’s job performance. In a departure from historical norms, these voters narrowly voted for the president’s party in elections up and down the ballot in the 2022 midterms, even despite their misgivings about Biden. This was a major reason for the Democrats’ historic defiance of the odds and represented a stark departure from the 2018 midterms that took place under Trump. That year’s “meh” voters broke for the out-party (the Democrats) by nearly 30 points. In 2020, when Trump was actually on the ballot, those who “somewhat disapproved” of his job performance voted for Biden by an whopping 37 points.
So far in the 2024 cycle, we have some indication that these voters may stick with Biden in November, even despite their lukewarm feelings toward him—indicating at least some of them may be coming from his own base. For instance, a recent poll in New Hampshire showed Biden with an abysmal 38% approval rating, and yet he was still beating Trump by seven points (52–45). He led Trump by an even wider 14-point margin (53–39) among the state’s “meh” voters. A separate national poll found that among voters who disliked both Biden and Trump, Biden had a 13-point advantage (mirroring his 17-point advantage with these voters in 2020).
The story seems to be that while voters are down on both Biden and Trump, they are really down on Trump. It remains to be seen whether this holds through to Election Day, but this is an at least somewhat encouraging sign for Biden.
What I’ll be watching for in the months ahead:
How do Biden’s “somewhat disapprovers” break on Election Day?
We did get one development this week when an appeals court ruled that Trump did not have immunity from prosecution on criminal charges over his efforts to overturn the 2020 election.
Full disclosure: this is more or less where I fall.
Excellent post, and I'm so glad to have found you on here! I've always enjoyed your tweets, but the character limit on Twitter is a drag, and you're a nuanced writer, so it's nice to read your thoughts more fully.
As an aside, you actually inspired me to start my own Substack earlier this week, so big thanks for that! It's so liberating on here compared to Twitter, haha.