Hispanic Americans, once strongly Democratic, may be slowly becoming a swing group

But Democrats still appear to enjoy an advantage with them ahead of this year's midterms

For much of the 21st century, one of the prevailing assumptions about American politics has been that non-white voters, who represent a fast-growing share of the electorate, are a reliably Democratic voting bloc. This seemed exceptionally clear in 2008, when Barack Obama carried black Americans by a massive 91 points, Hispanics by 36 points, and Asians by 27 points on his way to winning the presidency.¹ According to estimates from the data firm Catalist, he ran up even higher margins with all three groups in 2012 to secure re-election, forcing the Republican Party to conduct an autopsy to figure out how to reverse its slide with these voters. Four years later, though, minority groups remained firmly Democratic, as Donald Trump’s unsubtle racism and xenophobia led Hillary Clinton to enjoy similarly high levels of support from them.

Three successive cycles of resounding Democratic success with racial minorities (and other key groups) in national elections led many in and around the party to believe that—to borrow an ill-fated statement—“demographics are destiny.” In other words, the more diverse (and less white) the U.S. became, the likelier it would be that Democrats would build and retain some type of “permanent majority” with which to govern for decades to come.

Then came the 2020 election, which threw all that into question. On election night, one of the first major swing states to report was Florida. As the Sunshine State began releasing results, it looked like Democratic nominee Joe Biden might have a big problem: Hispanic voters, who made up 20.5% of the state’s eligible voting population, were not backing him at nearly the rate that they had Obama and Clinton.² Then, results in other states started trickling in, and it became apparent that this trend was not exclusive to Florida, where his underperformance could have been in part chalked up to the state’s notoriously conservative Cuban American community. Indeed, Trump appeared to make significant gains with Hispanic voters everywhere, increasing his national vote share with them by eight points compared to 2016.

Trump’s performance with Hispanics defied the conventional wisdom that they were—and would always be—a solidly Democratic cohort. Post-election analyses confirmed that the rightward shifts among these voters (and some other non-white voters, too) took place in metro areas across the country.³ To be sure, Biden still won Hispanics fairly comfortably at the national level, 61–36%. But his margins clearly shrank relative to Clinton’s and Obama’s, and they were startlingly low for a Democrat in swing states like Nevada (whose population is 30% Hispanic) and Wisconsin:

The reasons for this shift have been well-documented: it largely came down to the economy and COVID. Trump, whose hardline immigration rhetoric in 2016 turned off many Hispanics, instead focused more on his stewardship of the economy pre-pandemic and desire to re-open it as soon as possible. This messaging resonated with some Hispanic voters, as COVID lockdowns had forced businesses around the country to close, many of which were owned by Hispanic Americans. As a 2020 election post-mortem by Equis Research found, the economic shutdown and Trump’s pivot from immigration to the economy seemed to give some Hispanics a “permission structure” to embrace his candidacy the second time around.

Additionally, as political analyst Ruy Teixeira has noted, data show that these voters tend to be “upwardly mobile, patriotic, culturally moderate to conservative citizens with practical and down to earth concerns focused on jobs, the economy, health care, effective schools and public safety.” So, while Hispanics have been a reliably Democratic bloc for years, they hold some views and beliefs that could at times align them more with Republicans.

Perhaps most concerningly for Democrats is that the 2020 election does not appear to have been an aberration. In the 2021 Virginia governor’s race, Democrat Terry McAuliffe carried Hispanic voters by 14 points, the lowest margin for any recent top-of-the-ticket Democrat in the state. Then, earlier this summer, a Latina Republican named Mayra Flores won a special congressional election in Texas in a historically Democratic border district. (And Republicans could make further gains in the region this November.) Public polling over the past two years has reinforced that these shifts are indeed happening.

All this has begged an obvious question: to what extent will this slide impact the 2022 midterms? Last month, the New York Times provided perhaps the most detailed look yet this election cycle at Hispanic voters—not just as a whole but broken down across a host demographic lines, including age, sex, education, and more. The results paint a picture of a group of voters who are still more Democratic than they are Republican, but whose support for Democrats is not nearly as strong as it was even a few years ago (let alone a decade ago). They additionally hold a mix of views on the major issues of the day.

Understanding the nuances of the largest—and rapidly growing—non-white group in the U.S. is paramount for both parties as they look to gain an advantage with them in the midterms next month and beyond. Among some of the key takeaways from the poll’s crosstabs:

• While Hispanics clearly side with Democrats on some issues, they are more divided on others—including some that may be decisive. Like many Americans, Hispanics do not have uniformly liberal or conservative views. They do tend to lean more toward Democrats, but on some key issues—the economy, crime, and illegal immigration—they are more divided. In fact, it is these exact issues that Republicans are hoping to ride to victory in the November midterms. However, the poll also shows that Hispanics believe by a 50–30% margin that Democrats are “focused on the most important issues,” which might give the party some confidence despite their slim advantage on this group’s top issue—the economy.

• The economy is by far the top issue for Hispanics, and it’s unclear which party will benefit from this. Hispanics care first and foremost about the economy, which outweighs social issues by more than a 2–1 margin (54–25%). Moreover, when asked which party they agree with more on that issue, it’s evenly split: 43% say Democrats, and 41% say Republicans. One way to interpret this is that Democrats—the party in power—have failed to garner an advantage on the top issue for most Americans (including Hispanics). But another way of looking at it is that, in the face of high inflation, a possible looming recession, and Republicans’ historical advantage on this issue, Democrats are still competitive on it. The point is: the economy looms large for Hispanics this year.

• Hispanics still perceive Democrats as the party of the working class, while they are likelier to see Republicans as elites and “extreme.” Despite efforts by some Republicans to rebrand the party as a multiracial working-class coalition, Hispanics continue to see Democrats as the party of the working class by a wide margin (58–27%), whereas a small plurality see Republicans as the party of elites. Additionally, by close to a 2–1 margin (51–28%), these voters consider Republicans more extreme than Democrats.

• Most Hispanics oppose greater restrictions on abortion, which may benefit Democrats. With only a couple of exceptions, virtually every subgroup of Hispanics favored fewer restrictions on abortion than more. On the whole, 61% said abortion should be legal in all or most cases while just 30% said it should be illegal in all or most cases (and only 12% said the procedure should be “always illegal”). This takeaway was particularly noteworthy given that nearly half of those surveyed identify as either Catholic (40%) or evangelical Christians (~8%).

• The gender divide among Hispanics is stark and growing. There is perhaps no demographic trait that more strongly predicts a Hispanic voter’s political leanings than their gender. On a host of issues, men were far more conservative than women. For instance, on the question of which party better represents the working class, women definitively chose Democrats over Republicans, 65–18%. However, only a plurality of men (49%) gave Democrats the nod, while a much larger share than women chose Republicans (37%). Men were also likelier than women to be concerned with economic issues over social issues, favor Trump over Biden in a 2024 rematch, and side with Republicans on several major issues.

• First-generation immigrants, those born abroad, and those who speak Spanish at home are far more Democratic than their peers. Across several questions, Hispanic voters who are themselves immigrants and likely to have been born abroad are more Democratic-leaning than second- and third-generation Hispanic Americans, as are those who speak Spanish at home. However, those who are more assimilated in the US—later generations who were born here and might be less likely to speak Spanish in the home (if at all)—lean toward Republicans.

• Hispanics still favor Democrats to control Congress, though by a smaller margin than they have historically. Overall, Hispanic voters say they are supporting Democrats over Republicans in the race for Congress next month by a margin of 56–32%. While the Democrats will likely welcome this 24-point cushion, which basically mirrors Biden’s 2020 margin with this community, it represents far lower support than they’ve received in recent election cycles from this group of voters. In the 2018 midterms, they backed Democrats by 35 points (67–32%). Even in the 2014 midterms, which saw historically low turnout and significant Republicans gains across the country, Hispanics supported Democrats by nearly 30 points (63–34%). This type of shift away from the party from a group with such immense political clout could be seismic.

Ultimately, although Democrats’ advantage with Hispanic Americans has eroded somewhat since 2020, these voters do still lean their way. Moreover, many of those who are increasingly skeptical of Democrats do not appear ready to jump ship for Republicans just yet. But Democrats cannot afford fall any further. Biden, who earned lower support from Hispanic voters in 2020 than Obama and Clinton, won the presidency in 2020 by just 42,918 votes across three states (one of which was heavily Hispanic Arizona). Clinton narrowly lost the presidency despite winning two-thirds of Hispanics. I make these observations to say that if Democrats are losing any ground with these voters, they will have to make it up elsewhere to stay competitive—something that may be difficult to do in light of how their coalition is changing.

One thing is for sure: given their growing share of the electorate, including in key swing states, whether Hispanic voters continue to slide away from Democrats or remain in the fold will likely be determinative not just in next month’s midterm elections but on our politics for years to come.

1. This, after Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry won African Americans by 77 points, Hispanics by 9 points, and Asians by 12 points in the 2004 election. (These results and Obama’s are from the National Election Pool exit polls.)

2. According to exit polls, Biden ultimately won Florida Hispanics by just 7 points, far lower than Clinton’s 27-point margin and Obama’s 21-point margin.

3. In fact, Biden’s vote share among all major non-white groups (black, Hispanic, and Asian voters) declined relative to Clinton’s in 2016. However, he did better than her with white voters.